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█ Abstract The purpose of this paper is to highlight some difficulties with Neil Sinhababu’s Humean the-
ory of agency, which stem from his radically reductivist approach, rather than his Humean sympathies. 
The argument is that Sinhababu’s theory builds on a critique of reflective agency which is based on sever-
al misunderstandings of the Kantian approach. Ultimately, the objection is that his reductivist view is un-
equipped to address the classical problems of rational deliberation and agential authority. 
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█ Riassunto Efficacia riflessiva – Questo articolo mette in luce alcune difficoltà della teoria proposta da 
Neil Sinhababu, che dipendono da un approccio radicalmente riduttivista. Si argomenta che la teoria di 
Sinhababu è basata su alcuni fraintendimenti a proposito dell’approccio kantiano alla teoria dell’azione. 
L’obiezione fondamentale è che questa posizione riduttivista non riesce a rendere conto adeguatamente 
della deliberazione razionale e dell’autorità dell’agente. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Teoria humeana; Deliberazione razionale; Agentività; Autorità; Christine Korsgaard 

IN HUMEAN NATURE, NEIL SINHABABU en-
gages in a fierce defense of the Humean ac-
count of nature, agency and reason. His lively 
and accessible language makes for an enter-
taining entry in a thorny debate. While the 
matter is complex, Sinhababu shows little 
doubt that the truth lies with Hume. Alterna-
tive approaches are judged simply wrong, 
false or, perhaps even worse, betrayals of Da-
vid Hume’s true account. 
This critical commentary will focus on 
Chapter 10, which addresses a cluster of prob-
lems organized under the title Agency and the 
Self. Sinhababu’s basic claim is that all the 
workings of agency can be fully explained in 
terms of desires. This is because selves/agents 
are constituted by desires. More precisely, 
agents consist of, at least in part, all of their de-
sires; and, second, desires are the only motiva-
tional states. These claims represent the 
Humean self-constitution thesis. The second 
claim is particularly reductive in that it says 
that desires are the only motivational states 
that can help explain human motivation; there 
are no other motivational aspects of agency or 
selfhood apart from desires. Sinhababu takes 
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agents and selves to be interchangeable con-
cepts. These strongly reductive claims are not 
just mere stipulations. In a nutshell, the argu-
ment in their support is that an exploration of 
the reasons why people do what they do, think 
what they think, and feel what they feel, ulti-
mately shows that it is because of their desires. 
Desires play a decisive explanatory role in all 
phenomena pertaining to agency. Their ex-
planatory power is not restricted to the domain 
of deliberative agency, but also includes 
thought and feeling. Furthermore, according to 
Sinhababu’s argument in Chapter 9, desires 
play a crucial normative role in that they trans-
form considerations into reasons, make us rec-
ognize such reasons and act on them. Once this 
claim has been established, there is no incentive 
to introduce any other element into the ma-
chinery: all is operated by desires, including 
particular reasons to act, feel and believe. 
This is a particularly strong formulation of 
the Humean claim regarding the nature of 
agency. In comparison to other recent defens-
es of Hume’s ethics, such as Jaqueline Taylor’s 
Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy and So-
ciety in Hume’s Philosophy,1 Sinhababu’s theo-
ry radicalizes the reductivist aspects of 
Hume’s approach to ethics. This is not the 
place to adequately compare various legacies 
of Hume’s philosophy. The purpose of this 
commentary is to highlight some difficulties 
with Sinhababu’s theory, which I attribute to 
his radically reductivist approach, rather than 
to his Humean sympathies. I shall focus on a 
standard objection, which has been voiced by 
several philosophers in the Kantian tradition, 
according to which the reductivist view is ill 
equipped to deal with the classical problems of 
rational deliberation. 
 
█ The deliberative standpoint 
 
The problem that philosophers such as 
Christine Korsgaard or Jay R. Wallace identi-
fy with the reductivist understanding of 
Hume’s ethics is that it makes “the agent” ul-
timately disposable: If all the motivational 
and normative work underlying agency is ac-
complished by desires, what is the role of the 
self in the production of action? According to 
Sinhababu, this is no objection at all and can 
be defused in one strike. The self is also par-
tially constituted by desires, so to explain 
agency by desires alone does not rule out the 
self. What is interesting in the stuff of the self 
is, again, the desires that constitute it. Practi-
cal agency is constituted by the motivational 
effects of desires.  
Sinhababu recognizes that the phenome-
nology of deliberate choice, seems to require 
something more substantial and structurally 
organized than the stuff of desires. This is es-
pecially apparent in the case of temptation, as 
Sinhababu recognizes, but it is not limited to 
this special phenomenon of deliberation. In 
fact, the problem is pervasive, and its perva-
siveness shows that the reductivist Humean 
account cannot make sense of rational delib-
eration, even though it might be a description 
of how some motives trump others in ordi-
nary deliberation. Whether this is a perspicu-
ous description is doubtful, but it is even 
more doubtful that this is a credible account 
of what happens when someone acts upon 
rational deliberation. The simpler case is 
temptation. In such a case, the agent feels 
and acknowledges that she has a strong and 
persistent desire, and feels and acknowledges 
that it is a motivational state but she also de-
nies that such a motivational state should 
take priority. The latter item in the agent’s 
mind is an evaluation. At this point, the re-
ductivist argument embraced in the previous 
chapters comes to the rescue and explains 
that the evaluation is nothing but a desire, 
perhaps a second-order desire about the sort 
of desires that one should have. For instance, 
Al is tempted by his desire to consume all the 
energy of a spaceship but he is constrained by 
the desire to behave according to the rule 
that all resources available on the spaceship 
be shared equally. Al is conflicted, and this is 
something that the Humean account can de-
scribe, but how can it make sense of the con-
straint? If the theory explains all conflicts of 
the mental life in terms of desires, there is no 
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other element to decide the matter but the 
strength of desires. This means that the re-
ductivist Humean theory does not distin-
guish between the intensity and the rational 
authority of desires. In the case of tempta-
tion, such a theory fails to explain why the 
desire to abide by the rule bears any authori-
ty for Al, since it is not stronger than the 
craving for energy. As it appears, the problem 
is not only phenomenological, even though 
the fact that a theory under-describes a phe-
nomenon in the life of the mind might be 
considered a serious failure. Another, per-
haps more significant, failure is that it cannot 
explain how one is motivated by a desire that 
one regards as more important, even though 
less intense. It is this eventuality that gives 
rise to the phenomenon of temptation. To 
see how pervasive this problem is, let us con-
sider other deliberative scenarios.  
Consider the case in which Al has a strong 
desire to consume all the energy of a space-
ship at once, but he also knows that some en-
ergy must be kept for the days to come, be-
cause there are no sources for generating new 
energy. In this case, Al experiences conflict-
ing desires, and the correct way to solve the 
problem is to recognize that there is a reason 
to postpone the craving, independently of its 
strength. To reason with himself toward this 
conclusion, Al must find that there is some-
thing more authoritative than the force of 
desires. If Al could count only on his desires, 
the decision would be taken only according 
to their strength. However, there is no guar-
antee that the strongest desire is also the cor-
rect one. From the reductivist Humean theo-
ry that Sinhababu defends there is no stand-
point from which the agent can even raise 
this question. The standpoint of agency is the 
standpoint of desires, which determine ac-
tions by exerting causal influence.  
In commenting on Jay R. Wallace’s for-
mulation of this objection,2 Sinhababu notic-
es that Kantians are worried about the pas-
sivity displayed in action. This is true, but it 
may be regarded as a secondary point in the 
present discussion. The main point is that 
there seems to be no standpoint for delibera-
tion, if all that counts is desires, hence no way 
to account for the distinction between cor-
rect and incorrect deliberation in addition to 
the criterion of the strength of desires. Thus, 
the objection is not that agency driven by de-
sires is not “real agency”. In a way, agency 
driven by desires qualifies as real agency in-
sofar as desires identify an agency and ex-
plain efficacy. But the efficacy that pertains 
to this form of agency has little to do with ra-
tional deliberation. There is no standpoint at 
which competing desires are assessed and 
measured. In fact, there is no need to intro-
duce such a theoretical apparatus. «Desire 
constitutes agents and its effects constitute 
their choosing»,3 as we are told. We are also 
told that «Desire constituting an intention is 
the agent choosing to act».4 The implication 
of these claims is that there is no need for a 
deliberative standpoint from which the com-
peting motivational items are assessed and au-
thorized because all deliberative problems are 
solved by referring to the strength of desires. 
Sinhababu presents this claim as an accom-
plishment of his Humean theory, but there are 
reasons to doubt that this is the case. 
 
█ The false problem of externality 
 
In his response to the Kantian objection, 
Sinhababu insists that there is no reason to 
look and judge our desires as if from outside, 
from an external perspective. But this reply 
seems to me to be based on a mischaracteri-
zation of the whole controversy. He attacks 
the approach advocated by Wallace and Hol-
ton5 as unduly representing the theoretical 
need of a standpoint external to deliberation:  
 
If you’re resisting the temptation to eat 
something, either because you’re on a diet 
or so someone will reward you with two of 
them later, the desire to eat can seem like a 
force external to your agency. It appears as 
something that might make you do what 
you really don't want to do, unless you fight 
it. It’s still part of you, so it isn’t a force to-
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tally alien to the self in the way that an op-
ponent's arm in an arm-wrestling match is 
alien. But we look upon such desires warily, 
from a position outside of them that makes 
them not seem like parts of the self. Desire 
isn’t usually like this. In simple enjoyment of 
food, the desire to eat doesn't seem like 
something external. One sees food from 
within the standpoint of desire, absorbed in 
attention to its delicious features.6  
 
I agree that to explain the dynamics of ra-
tional deliberation it is neither necessary nor 
appropriate to think of the self as an external 
perspective on one’s mind. The risk of this 
strategy is that it loses track of the distinction 
between authorization and alienation. How-
ever, it is quite doubtful that this distinction 
can be preserved and explained by invoking 
the claim that the self just is its content, i.e. 
the desires that it contains. This claim cannot 
explain by itself how the content of the self is 
authorized. Sinhababu does not seem to ap-
preciate in full the objection put forward by 
the Kantian quarter. They are not worried 
about construing an external perspective 
from which to judge the content of the self. 
Rather, they are worried about vindicating 
the distinction between items of the self that 
are authorized so as to pertain to one’s own 
self, and items that belong in the self but re-
main unauthorized. To be sure, this distinc-
tion does not amount to postulating a per-
spective external to the self. The objection is 
that a plausible theory of agency cannot do 
without such a distinction. To this objection, 
it is not enough to reply that there can be no 
perspective external to the self. There are 
other ways to ground the distinction that as-
sume no such objectionable externality. 
A similar equivocation occurs in the brief 
passage where the author disposes of Kant’s 
theory by commenting on a famous passage 
of the Groundwork.7 Against the Kantian 
view as he reconstructs it, Sinhababu objects:  
 
If we saw reason as driven by forces outside 
of it, we’d see it as being determined by al-
ien influences, and therefore as unfree. And 
we can only see ourselves as agents under 
the idea of freedom. So the price of regard-
ing reason as the slave of the passions is fail-
ing to see ourselves as agents at all.8 
 
Sinhababu insists that one’s desires aren’t 
alien influences that would take away one’s 
freedom. This is what we are made of. The 
activity of desires just is our activity, which 
includes practical reasoning, is agency. Kant 
is talking of impulses, which are not straight-
forwardly “desires”, since the latter term is 
broader. This detail is relevant to the present 
discussion because at least according to some 
prominent interpretations, reason is sup-
posed to be “desiderative” in its practical 
function; this is exactly what explains its 
productive and motivating powers. Secondly, 
in the passage quoted, Kant is not talking 
about what belongs or does not belong in the 
self without qualification. Likewise, he may 
find nothing wrong in saying that impulses, 
desires, and feelings are “ours”, in the sense 
that they are subjective and rooted in our an-
imality. In Kantian jargon, they are recog-
nizable as elements of a phenomenal charac-
ter. Does it make them alien items? The 
question is that this level of explanation does 
not make sense of agential authority, which 
is the problem that the Kantian theory of ra-
tional agency is designed to address. Any 
fruitful discussion of Kantian theory should 
engage with this level of discussion of agency. 
But this is a level of discussion that the re-
ductivist agenda does not contemplate. Do 
Kantians reject the claims that “the activity 
of desires” includes “practical reasoning” or 
is equivalent to agency? Well, again, it all de-
pends on the meaning of these words. To be 
sure, the claim that the activity of desires is 
what we call reasoning and amounts to agen-
cy requires some unpacking. Kant distin-
guishes between the activity of pure reason 
and the activity of empirical practical reason, 
thus his theory of rational authority offers 
the theoretical resources for differentiating 
different though related activities that might 
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or might not involve desires. Their main 
point is that desires as well as any other unre-
flective elements in our mind do not exercise 
their authority directly: they do so under the 
guise of incentives that have to be assessed by 
reasoning.  
One legitimate concern is that reflective 
agency is just one very small portion of hu-
man agency, probably smaller than we are 
ready to acknowledge. But this is a different 
concern and it is not an objection to the 
Kantian approach. Kantians are well aware 
that reflective agency is a rare accomplish-
ment; their efforts are directed to establish 
that there is a distinction to be made between 
unreflective efficacy and reflective agency. 
For the Kantians the reductivist model owes 
us an explanation of the second kind of agen-
cy, which it is unequipped to offer; the reduc-
tivists do not see the problem. Ultimately, 
their differences concern the normative pow-
ers they attribute to reason.  
This disagreement is apparent in Sin-
hababu’s discussion of Christine Korsgaard’s 
theory of deliberation. He thinks that the 
emphasis on reflective agency makes her ac-
count incapable of recognizing serious forms 
of divisive conflicts. Indeed, even when the 
agent comes to a decision, he is still torn and 
divided between the defeating and the de-
feated desires, hence remains in an unhappy 
condition. By comparison, the purported ad-
vantage of the Humean model is that it ap-
pears to accord with our ordinary experience 
of hard choices. And it’s telling that Sinhaba-
bu takes these disagreements to be descrip-
tive, because they are philosophical hypothe-
ses about the form and powers of reasoning. 
At the descriptive level, however, it is 
hard to see why a Kantian theory could not 
make sense of the phenomenology of hard 
choices, e.g. admitting the reasonableness of 
regret. Korsgaard’s treatment of the conflicts 
of practical identities in her The Sources of 
Normativity centers exactly on this issue.9 
Precisely because of the importance of con-
flictual desires and plans, the unity of the self 
is not a stipulation but a deliberative task. In 
her view, rational deliberation shapes agency 
but this is not to deny that reasoning may be 
inefficacious and that there may be many de-
feating conditions that interfere with the 
causal powers of reasons. The case in which 
reasons are not efficacious calls for an expla-
nation, but it is not an argument in support 
of the so called Immutability Under Reason-
ing claim, according to which reasoning can-
not change our intrinsic desires.10 Trivially, 
Kantians agree that there are some conative 
states that cannot be changed by reasoning. 
Indeed, this is an important claim about what 
Kant calls “radical evil” and about the recalci-
trance of “inclinations”, a category that is of-
ten taken to be equivalent to desires. In the 
Kantian theory, these radical and recalcitrant 
elements do not undermine the possibility of 
reflective agency because they do not exer-
cise a direct influence on the mind, and their 
efficacy can be judged and assessed even 
when it cannot be resisted. This is a position 
that can be shared independently of special 
commitments to Kantian ethics. For in-
stance, Harry Frankfurt draws an analogous 
distinction without any allegiance to the 
Kantian tradition.11 He argues that there are 
psychological forces that we cannot resist be-
cause they overcome us, as in the case of ter-
ror and compulsion; and there are psycholog-
ical forces that we cannot resist because we 
do not want to resist them in that they repre-
sent our volitional constraints. No doubt 
there are other fruitful approaches closer to 
Hume’s tradition, such as Jacqueline Taylor’s 
account of reflective subjects. My point has 
been that the reductivist view owes us an ex-
planation of a phenomenon that it is not 
equipped to describe correctly. 
 
█ The costs of reductivism 
 
One might accept or even welcome the 
radical reductivist approach as a strategy to 
simplify the philosophical account of agency, 
doing without items perhaps more mysterious 
than desires, e.g. intentions, agents, and the 
“rational will”. Whether the very notion of 
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“desire” is really less mysterious, theoretically 
innocent and as such does not stand in need of 
a philosophical defense, is something to be 
seen. As Thomas Scanlon has pointed out in 
his What We Owe to Each Other,12 the explana-
tory power of desires ultimately depends on 
the fact that they work as normative items 
whose normativity is taken for granted. If so, 
then they can explain normative phenomena 
such as those arising in deliberation but to 
see why and how, we need to verify how they 
have acquired their normative status. With-
out any such defense, we are left with no 
philosophical account of authority, including 
the authority that desires have in delibera-
tion, and even in the case that they are all the 
stuff of agency. The cost of this philosophical 
strategy is that it loses sight of phenomena 
that pertains to the individual life of the 
mind, and it renounces to explain macro-
phenomena such as the possibility of com-
munities governed by norms, where norms 
constrict and bind independently of the 
strength of desires. It seems to me that this is 
too heavy a cost for any plausible philosophi-
cal theory to knowingly incur. 
The author resumes his modus operandi in 
Chapter 11, which builds upon the defense of 
the Humean Theory and considers the 
metaethical significance of its alleged truth. As 
we all recognize, Humean theory is often cho-
sen for its simplicity and parsimonious ontolo-
gy. Whether these features warrant any explan-
atory power is an open question. Sinhababu’s 
defense of the Humean Theory begins with de-
scribing moral phenomenology in terms of de- 
______ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sires and beliefs and, not surprisingly, ends with 
a declaration of triumph. For those describing 
phenomenology differently, his defense re-
mains unconvincing. 
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